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I. Introduction
Although cash transfer programmes have been implemented and evaluated
for more almost a decade, very little is known about how they affect
households that are located in communities where the programme is
implemented but that are not officially registered for the programme
(either because they are ineligible or are unwilling to participate).
The vast majority of evaluations focus on households that are officially
registered. Cash transfer programmes, however, are likely to affect all
households living in a community, even those that are not participating.
Why should we care about non-participant households? In many cases,
those deemed “ineligible” for the programme are far from what we would
consider “well-off”. Since government and donor budgets often only
suffice to include the “poorest of the poor” into a programme, some degree
of poverty persists even among programme-ineligible households
(Lehmann, 2009a). If a cash transfer programme exhibits significant
positive spillover effects on programme-ineligible households, then
evaluations that focus solely on programme participants underestimate
the overall impact on poverty.
Only very recently has more attention been devoted to filling the knowledge
gap on how cash transfers affect ineligible households in the same community. This Policy Research Brief presents an overview
of the mostly very recent and in part preliminary evidence for externalities on schooling, health and economic indicators such as
consumption, access to credit, and asset holdings. The results suggest that when ineligible households are incorporated into the
evaluation design, the overall impact of cash transfer programmes on poverty is much greater than previously recorded.
II. Schooling Externalities
It is well known that most cash transfer programmes have a positive effect on the school enrolment of children from
programme-participant households (in Cambodia, for example, such programmes increased secondary school enrolment by
about 30 per cent). Do programme-ineligible households change their human capital investments as a consequence of the
behavioural change of participants? Bobonis and Finan (2009) find a five percentage-point increase in secondary school
enrolment among children from ineligible households in villages where a cash transfer programme is implemented.
This increase is “pro-poor” in the sense that there is a higher increase in enrolment among children from poorer programme-
ineligible families than among children from less poor ineligible families. For instance, among ineligible households whose level
of poverty is above the median for ineligible households, secondary school enrolment increased by about six percentage points.
On the other hand, no schooling externality could be found among ineligible households with a low incidence of poverty.
What are the mechanisms behind the schooling externality? Since poverty-stricken households often underestimate the future
returns to investments in education, many cash transfer programmes seek to induce changes in the value that households attach
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non-pecuniary value of keeping their children in school.
Through social interactions (extended family networks,
going to church, markets, festivities and so forth), this
information is likely to reach ineligible families as well,
triggering behavioural changes with respect to human
capital investments. Furthermore, cash transfer programmes
often cause changes in the provision of educational supply-
side resources, such as teachers and schooling materials.
That is, additional supply-side resources are usually allocated
to schools in localities that are included in the programme in
order to prevent a deterioration of the quality of education.
The latter may serve as an incentive for programme-
ineligible households to keep their children in school.
Moreover, the increase in local demand induced by a cash
transfer programme may increase the income of ineligible
households (multiplier effects). The latter, for example,
may sell more to programme participants and invest the
additional income in paying school fees.
In many countries, cash transfer programmes start
as small-scale pilot initiatives. Often, programme and
non-programme villages are located fairly close together.
In this setting, Gignoux (2009) finds that schooling
externality occurs even across villages. That is, a cash transfer
programme increases school enrolment in neighbouring
non-programme villages. As in the case of the within-village
schooling externality, imitation effects are also likely to occur
across villages if there are extended family members or
friends in the neighbouring village, or if children attend
school in a neighbouring village. Another possible channel
generating externality across villages is that households
in non-programme villages anticipate a cash transfer
programme in their own village, and thus act in favour
of their future eligibility. For example, if cash grants are
conditional on school attendance in the upper secondary
grades and the household anticipates that the transfer
programme will be implemented in its village in the future,
then the household has an incentive to keep teenagers
enrolled in secondary school in order to receive the cash
grant when the programmes reaches the village.
III. Economic Externalities
Inequality. Poverty and inequality are closely linked.
Unequal societies frequently have higher crime rates,
a higher probability of violent conflict, and a higher
incidence of poverty than equal societies. A positive
externality on programme-ineligible households thus
arises if a cash transfer programme reduces inequality
in the community. Handa et al. (2000) analyse changes in
inequality for Mexico’s Progresa cash transfer programme.
Using different measures of inequality, they find a
5–12 percentage-point decline in inequality induced
by the programme.
Food consumption. Angelucci and De Giorgi (2009),
again looking at Progresa, find that ineligible households in
Source: Lehmann (2009a).
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villages where the programme is implemented can increase
their food consumption by a magnitude close to that of
households receiving the transfer. Lehmann (2009a) shows
that the increase in food consumption for poorer ineligible
households is considerable (that is, it is “pro-poor”),
as Figure 1 illustrates.
The figure visualises the relationship between the
increase in ineligible households’ monthly per capita
food consumption and their level of pre-programme
poverty. The latter is represented by a wealth
multidimensional index. The lower the index, the higher
the level of poverty. Each dot represents the increase in
food consumption for a programme-ineligible household
in our sample (non-recipients of transfers) due to the
existence of a cash transfer programme in the village.
The downward-sloping line shows the trend. Note that
poorer ineligible households benefit more from the
existence of a programme in their village. Their increase
in food consumption is, on average, higher than
that of “better-off” ineligible households in the
same village.
Assets. Livestock is essential to sustain livelihood in
developing countries. Livestock serves not only as source
of food (such as chicken eggs and goat milk) but also as
risk insurance against shocks (for example, smoothing
consumption in the event of drought, medical expenses
in the event of disease, funeral costs). Barrientos et al. (2006)
find that the asset holdings of programme-ineligible
households in villages where a cash transfer programme
is implemented are significantly higher than those
among ineligible households in villages where there
is no programme.
The former have a 10.7 per cent higher probability of
owning livestock after the first year of the programme,
and a 16.7 per cent higher probability after about two years.
These results indicate not only externality effects of a cash
transfer programme on asset holdings, but also that these
effects take some time
to manifest themselves.
Loan availability. The availability of credit is a key instrument
to alleviate poverty. The Nobel Peace Prize awarded to
Muhammad Yunus, founder of the famous Grameen Bank
(which gives loans to impoverished families), shows the
importance attached to credit as a means of alleviating
poverty. Do cash transfer programmes exhibit externality
on ineligible households’ access to credit? Lehmann
(forthcoming) finds that credit availability increases
only for the “better-off” among ineligible households.
They are perceived as more creditworthy and eventually
possess more assets that may be leveraged as collateral.
Increased credit availability not only enables the household
to smooth consumption when hit by shocks (such as
medical expenses in the event of disease, or funeral costs),
but also to invest in income generating activities such as
agricultural inputs, livestock and so on.
IV. Social Externalities
Macours and Vakis (2008) find large social externality
effects on human and physical capital accumulation and
aspirations, depending on the proximity of households
to female community leaders who participate in the cash
transfer programme (that is, women with leadership
responsibilities in the community). Exposure to a
community leader is likely to trigger imitation effects by
both participant and non-participant households, the
result of admiration for or loyalty to community leaders.
Macours and Vakis find a school enrolment externality
of six percentage points on beneficiaries who are exposed to
community leaders. The impact on total consumption almost
doubles. Moreover, the higher the share of female leaders,
the more likely are beneficiary households to engage in
productive activities. Proximity to female leaders also affects
the attitudes of programme participants.
The higher the share of female leaders, the more likely are
participants to express optimism about the future and have
lower indicators of depression. Those effects are then likely
to spill over to non-participants—taking into account the
findings of Bobonis and Finan (2009) and Angelucci and
DeGiorgi (2009), described above.
V. Health Externalities
The results presented by Miguel and Kremer (2004) suggest
that cash transfer programmes with complementary
deworming activities in schools have positive externality
effects on programme-ineligible children. They evaluate
a Kenyan experiment in which deworming drugs were
distributed to a certain number of children per school,
but not to all children.
They observe not only lower absenteeism due to illness
among programme-ineligible children attending the same
school who did not officially receive the deworming drugs,
but also among children enrolled in non-programme schools
close to programme schools. Improved health outcomes
among programme participants is likely to have inspired
other households to let their children take deworming
drugs as well.
In many cash transfer programmes, a cash supplement is
given on condition that programme-participant families
with small children have regular nutritional checkups.
Several studies confirm that visits to health clinics
(nutrition surveillance) rose for programme-participant
households. Handa et al. (2000) analyse externality effects
on ineligible households created by the increase in
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Their results point to important externality effects in terms
of the healthcare behaviour of ineligible households.
One year after the programme began there was an
estimated seven percentage-point difference in nutrition
surveillance rates between ineligible children in
programme villages and ineligible children in non-
programme villages.
Bobonis, G. and Finan, F. (2009) find that the average
number of days of reported illness among poorer ineligible
children declines. The same is true for days of difficulty
with daily activities due to illness, days of no activities due
to illness, and days in bed due to illness.
VI. Conclusion
This Policy Research Brief has presented the little and in part
preliminary evidence of the positive externality effects that
cash transfer programmes have on non-participants. Existing
studies suggest positive externality on schooling, health, food
consumption and economic indicators (inequality, assets, loan
availability and so on). Hence current and past evaluations
that focus entirely on programme participants are likely to
underestimate the overall impact on poverty.
In order to accurately assess and eventually predict ex-ante
the impact of a cash transfer programme, it is essential to
incorporate non-beneficiaries in the evaluation design.
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